The Fair Housing Act Amendments and Age Restrictive Covenants in Condominiums and Cooperatives by Napolitano, Nicole
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 73 
Number 1 Volume 73, Winter 1999, Number 1 Article 12 
March 2012 
The Fair Housing Act Amendments and Age Restrictive 
Covenants in Condominiums and Cooperatives 
Nicole Napolitano 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Napolitano, Nicole (1999) "The Fair Housing Act Amendments and Age Restrictive Covenants in 
Condominiums and Cooperatives," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 73 : No. 1 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol73/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AMENDMENTS
AND AGE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN
CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES
Residential associations in condominiums and cooperatives
have been described as "mini-government[s],"' "residential pri-
vate governments,"2 and even as "quasi-government[s]- '... lit-
tle democratic sub societ[ies] of necessity.' "" These descriptions
are due in part to the associations' broad powers over structural
changes,4 as well as the ability to regulate the lives of both its
' Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647,
659 (1981) [hereinafter Judicial Review]. See generally 4 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY § 36.08 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (citations omitted) [hereinafter
THOmPSON].
2 Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 472
(1985) [hereinafter Residential Associations].
3 Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1320 (N.Y.
1990) (quoting Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975)). The courts have generally used four different standards of review to
evaluate residential board decisions. These include: the constitutional review, the
equitable reasonableness standard, the business judgment rule, and a review based
upon a consensual contract theory. See Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the En-
forceability of Condominium Rules, 22 STETSON L. REV. 1133, 1140-51 (1993)
(pointing out the need to turn to case law to find a basis for invalidating board deci-
sions due to a lack of statutory authority); Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 656-66
(explaining that the tradition of likening property law to the limitation of land use
agreements proves unworkable in the condominium concept because careful plan-
ning ensures that property law requirements are satisfied and this concern is the
reason for the evolution of different standards of review); Residential Associations,
supra note 2, at 475-90 (discussing the policies underlying the different standards of
review); see also Richard Siegler, 'Levandusky' Revisited, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 1998, at
3 (noting that the business judgment rule is so broad that the residential associa-
tion's judgment has been upheld against almost any challenge).
4 Residential associations run the daily operations of the community, regulate
finances, adopt and amend restrictive covenants and regulations, institute or defend
litigation, tax residents, and regulate such items as pets, parking spaces, and struc-
tural alterations through a democratic processes used to make decisions. See
WARREN FREEDMAN & JONATHAN B. ALTER, THE LAW OF CONDOMINIA AND
PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS 23-26 (1992) (defining the homeowner's associa-
tion and contrasting it with community association management); THOMPSON, supra
note 1, at § 36.08(a) (explaining the duties of a condominium residential associa-
tion); Schiller, supra note 3, at 1137 (discussing the powers allocated to the resi-
dential association and the function of the executive board); see also Louise Hickok,
Note, Promulgation and Enforcement of House Rules, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1132,
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members and prospective purchasers.5 Various covenants in-
cluded within the by-laws or the lease enable these associations
to determine who may be future members and exclude those they
find undesirable. It has long been recognized that cooperative
and condominium owners should, absent discrimination, decide
for themselves whom they choose to live near and share their re-
sponsibilities.6 These restrictive covenants ensure that a pro-
spective purchaser is compatible with the other members, as
well as with the objective character of the community, e.g.,
adults only.7 However, these covenants have established a broad
1136-43 (1974) (discussing the residential association's control over alterations
made by residents, their use of appliances, owning pets, and nuisances).
r See Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments,
77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 277 (1997) (suggesting that residential associations have the
ability to control lifestyles and allocate benefits and burdens to its members through
the powers granted by the governing documents).
See Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 160 N.E.2d 720, 722-24 (N.Y. 1959)
(holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to assign his shares of stock in the defen-
dant corporation because he did not receive the written consent of the board of di-
rectors, managing directors, or by lessees owning at least two-thirds of the stock in
the corporation, which was required under the lease but was withheld without ex-
planation). This decision is said to have given absolute discretion to associations to
approve or disprove prospective purchasers. See Patrick J. Rohan, Condominiums
and the Consumer: A Checklist For Counseling The Unit Purchaser, 48 ST. JOHN's L.
REV. 1028, 1057 & n.89 (1974); see also Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 481
N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (App. Div. 1984) (noting that the board of directors in a coopera-
tive apartment house has the "contractual and inherent power to approve or disap-
prove the transfer of shares and the assignment of proprietary leases") (quoting
Goldstone v. Constable, 443 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (App. Div. 1981)).
"[C]ondominium living is unique and requires a greater degree of control over
and limitation upon the rights of the individual owners .... " Scott E. Mollen, Con-
dominiums: Prohibition on Leasing Condominium Units is Not Unreasonable Re-
straint on Alienation, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 25, 1998, at 5 (quoting Four Brothers Homes
at Heartland Condominium 1 v. Gerbino, Index No. 11623/97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18,
1998) (allowing for blanket prohibition against leasing in condominium unit)). There
is also no sympathy for the unit owner who cannot sell his unit to a family with
children. See Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n v. Chambliss, 705 S.W.2d 211, 213
(Tex. App. 1985) (noting that residents must accept the obligations of condominium
regulations as well as the benefits).
7 See STEPHEN M. GOLANT, HOUSING AMERICA'S ELDERLY 30 (1992) (pointing
out that the dominant concern among condominium and cooperative owners or rent-
ers are the neighbors and whether they are socially compatible, loud, or clean (e.g.,
living next to someone with an noxious housing unit)); see also Mollen, supra note 6
(recognizing that a condominium association has the right to promote the objective
character of the community through a blanket prohibition against leasing because of
the lack of desire to live near a renter who might be careless in maintaining the unit
and common areas); Sterk, supra note 5, at 322 (noting that because residential as-
sociations' actions are based on promoting the residential character of the common
interest community, rentals may be prohibited for fear that lessees will not main-
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reach because housing discrimination has always been difficult
to prove.8
One of the more controversial covenants is the age restric-
tive covenant.9 Although age discrimination exists when a fam-
ily is rejected from a condominium or cooperative because of its
children,'0 this restriction had survived numerous attacks on its
validity." This resulted from society's failure to attach any
tain their units or common areas and produce higher economic liability in the fi-
ture); VINCENT DI LORENZO, THE LAW OF CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES §
6.0411] (1990) (noting that financial capability is another concern).
" See Iver Peterson, As Co-ops Spread, Discrimination Concerns Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1990, § 10, at 1 (citing that the chief of New York City's Commission
on Human Rights believes that cooperative board members can easily discriminate
against prospective purchasers because they "can hide behind the shared values
system of one another"); James C. McKinley Jr., Panel Accuses Co-op of Violating
Inheritance Rights in a Gay Partnership, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1992, at B3 (stating
that it would be hard to prove that a cooperative association discriminated against a
potential resident because of sexual preference due to the "enormous discretion"
that such associations are afforded by law) (quoting Betsi Gertz, attorney for the
New York City Human Rights Commission); Benjamin Weiser, A Co-op Must Pay
$640,000 For Denying Sublet to Black, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1997, at Al (reporting
that critics of cooperative associations argue that racial discrimination often occurs
by cooperatives but is too difficult to prove because of the associations' power to re-
ject or accept applicants arbitrarily and without explanation); see also Barbara B.
Buchholz, The Home Stretch: How to Make Sure Your Deal's a Deal, Cmu. TRIB., May
23, 1997, § 8, at 1 (noting that the cooperative board's discretion is so broad it can
reject any applicant without offering a reason).
9 Other covenants, which enable the association to control occupancy in the con-
dominium or cooperative, include a right of first refusal or the right of the board to
withhold consent prior to the sale. See DI LORENZO, supra note 7, at § 6.01. How-
ever, these covenants might not be as successful in attempting to block potential
sales or leases. See id. at §§ 6.0213] [a] [i], 6.0212] [a] (discussing whether consent by
the board can be arbitrarily denied); see also Rohan, supra note 6, at 1057 (noting
that a right of first refusal will rarely be exercised due to the fact that the purchase
price would have to be raised via an assessment against the other unit owners).
'0 Condominiums or cooperatives have also excluded children through restric-
tive covenants that limit the number of occupants in a housing unit. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1360 (D. Haw. 1995) (finding
such a covenant to be a "prima facie violation of the [FHAA]"); Fair Hous. Council v.
Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (asserting the Act has been violated by
imposing occupancy restrictions regardless of the intent behind them); United
States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1023 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (finding a violation of the
FHAA where there was a two person occupancy limit).
1, See DI LORENZO, supra note 7, at §§ 7.01-7.06 (noting that the restrictive
covenant has been upheld despite challenges that it is unconstitutional, an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation, violative of state civil rights legislation, or simply
unreasonable). See, e.g., Ritchey v. Villa Neuva Condominium Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr.
695, 698 (Ct. App. 1978) (finding reasonable restraint on alienation); White Egret
Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 352 (Fla. 1979) (upholding constitu-
tionality of an age restriction); Hill v. Fontaine Condominium Ass'n, 334 S.E.2d 690,
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"moral stigma" to housing discrimination against children.
In 1988, Congress finally amended the Fair Housing Act
("FHA") to include protection against housing discrimination to
those with familial status. With its passage, adult-only com-
munities are prohibited, unless they qualify as housing for older
persons. This Note will focus on the Fair Housing Act Amend-
ments ("FHAA") of 1988 and 1995 and how they apply to coop-
eratives and condominiums with respect to discrimination
against families with children. Part I will discuss the FHAA of
1988 and 1995 and the history of the exemption provided for
communities qualifying as "housing for older persons." Part H
will analyze the broad application of the FHAA to condominiums
and cooperatives. Finally, Part III will briefly offer some reasons
why senior-housing communities should be allowed to enforce re-
strictive covenants against families with children.
I. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1988 AND 1995
The FHA originally was enacted in 1968 to provide for pro-
tection against discrimination based upon race, color, religion, or
national origin.13 The FHA, also known as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, was amended in 1974 to include sex discrimination'4
691 (Ga. 1985) (holding that an age requirement was a reasonable restraint on al-
ienation); cf Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n, v. Chambliss, 705 S.W.2d 211,
(Tex. App. 1985) (holding an age restriction constitutional); see also Judicial Review,
supra note 1, at 657 (arguing that the consensual nature of the condominium and
cooperative, in which members consent to the power and authority of the associa-
tion, vitiates the basis for constitutional review); Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n
v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. App. 1985) (noting that there is a
strong presumption of validity of a restrictive covenant where an owner buys a con-
dominium with knowledge and acceptance of the restrictive covenants).
12 See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Sec-
ond Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1097-98 (1989) (noting that
society justified this type of discrimination on the basis that it was visible through
advertisements or covenants, thereby informing the victimized families of the rea-
son they were denied residency).
1" The FHA ensures the " 'removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary bar-
riers' " designed to discriminate on the basis of irrelevant characteristics of potential
buyers of real estate. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th
Cir. 1974) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971)).
14 See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. 514 U.S. 725, 728 n.1 (1995)
(discussing the inclusion of sexual discrimination under the FHA via the enactment
of section 808(b) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat.
729 (1974)); see also Deer Hill Arms H Ltd. Partnership v. Planning Comm'n, 686
A.2d 974, 977 (Conn. 1996) (describing the history of the Act, the policies behind the
implementation of the Act, as well as subsequent amendments enacted to further
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and, in 1988, its scope was further expanded to protect both the
disabled and persons with familial status.' 5
Prior to the FHAA, neither the states nor the federal gov-
ernment provided effective relief to condominium and coopera-
tive applicants who were being rejected because they had chil-
dren.'6 Although sixteen states recognized that families with
children were being denied housing, the state laws were not ef-
fective remedies.' For example, before the FHAA, an age re-
strictive covenant allowed a condominium association to seek the
eviction of a family with a nine-year old child. 8
"Familial status" under the FHAA extends protection to
those persons under the age of eighteen who are domiciled with a
parent, legal custodian or someone designated by them. 9 It also
those policies).
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994); see also United States v. Branella, 972 F. Supp.
294, 297 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting that the FHAA of 1988 "accorded families broad pro-
tection-essentially as much as racial minorities and other groups protected by Title
VII"); Arc of New Jersey, Inc. v. New Jersey, 950 F. Supp. 637, 642 (D.N.J. 1996)
(noting that the FHAA was illustrative of the nation's commitment to end the ex-
clusion of disabled persons from the mainstream of American life).
16 See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2180.
17 See id. These states included Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Dlli-
nois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. See id. & n.34. However,
there was no consistency among the state laws. Arizona, Rhode Island, and Virginia
exempted from its anti-discrimination laws housing with an occupancy limitation to
those persons 18 or older. See id. & n.35. Maine, Massachusetts, and Minnesota al-
lowed the segregation of families within a complex. See id. & n.36. New Hampshire
and Michigan exempted retirement communities that had low entrance ages (45 and
50, respectively). See id. & n.37. Further, "New Jersey and Illinois protect[ed] only
children under 14." Id. at 19. Finally, "nline states cover[ed] only rental and not
sale housing." Id. at 19 n.38.
'8 See Jeanne DeQuine, Condo Wants Child Out: Her Family Hopes To Sell
Home First, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 3, 1989, at 03A, available in 1989 WL 6234415
(describing the association's efforts to evict a child who was forced to move into the
condominium with her father because her mother had died).
19 See id. There is now federal protection for adults with children and protection
from gender discrimination, but there is no protection under the FRA for homo-
sexuals who are denied housing by a residential association because of their sexual
preference. See Richard Siegler Homosexual Discrimination: Sublet Policies, N.Y.
L.J., May 1, 1991, at 3 (noting that homosexuals must rely on state and local laws
for relief). There is also no federal protection based upon marital status. See Swan-
ner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 981 (1994) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) ("[Tihere is... no Tirm national policy' against
marital status discrimination in housing decisions" and there has never been any
"heightened scrutiny" under the Constitution for housing discrimination based upon
marital status) (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United State, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983)).
1999]
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extends to pregnant women and those in the process of securing
legal custody of a child less than eighteen years of age.20 The
FHAA does not provide protection against housing discrimina-
tion based upon any age, but only against families with chil-
dren."'
"Discrimination is particularly tragic when it means a fam-
ily is refused housing near good schools, a good job, or simply in
a better neighborhood to raise children."' Congress recognized
that the United States has a policy of protecting children and
families by noting that families are " 'perhaps the most funda-
mental social institution of our society.' "2 Two national surveys
conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") persuaded the government to provide housing pro-
tection to children.' One survey showed that twenty-five per-
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (1994).
21 See Town of Northborough v. Collins, 653 N.E.2d 598, 599 (Mass. App. Ct.
1995) (questioning whether the eviction of a couple in their thirties from a condo-
minium can be brought under the FHAA); see also 141 CONG. REC. H14967 (daily
ed. Dec. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep. Frank) (recognizing that "[ilf you are housing
open to anybody, if you are housing open for people in their 20's, 30's, 40's, you may
not discriminate against children").
22President's Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 11
PUB. PAPERS, 1156 (Sept. 13, 1991).
' H.R. REP. No. 100-711, supra note 16, at 19 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 769 (1977)). The Supreme Court has also recognized that conceiving and
raising children are "'essential,' basic civil rights of man and .. . far more precious
than property rights.'" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omit-
ted); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (recognizing
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to decide matters concerning
marriage and family life); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D.
IlM. 1996) (observing that people consider having children to be "one of life's most
significant moments and greatest achievements"); Frank DeLucia, Comment, Con-
necticut's Juvenile Curfew Ordinances: An Effective Means For Curbing Juvenile
Crime, or an Unconstitutional Deprivation of Minors' Fundamental Rights?, 15
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 357, 364 (1995) (positing that "[mlinors, like adults, possess cer-
tain fundamental rights under the Constitution").
However, children still are not protected to the full extent of the law as com-
pared with adults. See id. at 364-65 (describing the disparity of fundamental right
protection between adults and children as illustrated through the enforcement of
juvenile curfews). Before the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act, there was
little development of equal protection of children in the housing context. See Mi-
chael P. Seng, Discrimination Against Families With Children and Handicapped
Persons Under the 1988 Amendments To the Fair Housing Act, 22 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 541, 542 (1989). This limitation has been based upon the assertion that chil-
dren are incapable of mature, socially-acceptable behavior. See DeLucia, supra, at
364.
24 See JANE G. GREENE & GLENDA P. BLAKE, U.S. DEPT OF HOUSING & URBAN
DEV., How RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECT FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN
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cent of all rental units did not allow children.' Furthermore,
fifty percent were subject to restrictive policies that limited the
ability of families to live in those units; almost twenty percent of
the families surveyed were living in homes they considered less
desirable because of these restrictive practices. 8 Apparently,
Congress did not approve of those age restrictions set forth by
residential associations intended to exclude children from con-
dominiums and cooperatives.
Critics of the FHAA argued that the Act violated the right to
privacy by requiring that all housing communities open their
doors to children. 7 However, there is no affirmative duty upon
residents to invite children into their own homes.2 It was also
believed that the authorities would not provide as much support
nor as many resources to combat this discrimination as they
would in cases of racial or ethnic discrimination.29 Subsequently,
many feared that the protection given to families with children
would divert resources from the Act's fundamental purpose of
prohibiting race, sex, and ethnic discrimination."0
(1980); ROBERT W. MARANS ET AL., U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MEASURING
RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECTING FAmiLIES WITH CHILDREN: A NATIONAL
SURVEY (1980).
An added incentive to provide protection to families with children is that it also
strengthens the fight against racial discrimination. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 21
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2182. Statistics show that minority
households have a larger percentage of children. Additionally, a national survey
conducted by HUD showed that housing units in predominately white neighbor-
hoods contain restrictive covenants against children at a rate of 11.4% more than
those in predominately black communities. The final result is to effectively minimize
the potential for minority families to move into those neighborhoods. See id. But see
Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent-An Examination of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination
Against Families in Rental Housing, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1836-37 (1981)
(suggesting that uniformly applied restrictive covenants probably do not provide an
effective way to discriminate against minorities because too many families have
white male householders to make such a practice an effective "smokescreen")
[hereinafter Why Johnny Can't Rent].
2' See MARANS ET AL., supra note 24, at 24.
26 See id. at 51-53; see also id at 54-59 (revealing the reasons why persons with-
out children will either select housing to avoid them or move if families with chil-
dren are allowed occupancy).
2 See Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir.
1992) (upholding the FHAA against a constitutional attack alleging a violation of
the privacy right, and reasoning that the right to privacy does not include the right
to control whether families with children can move next door). See infra notes 62-67
and accompanying text for a discussion of other claims of unconstitutionality.
28 See Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, 965 F.2d at 1036.
29 See Kushner, supra note 12, at 1097-98.
:" See id.
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Congress did not believe that all housing that excludes chil-
dren constitutes a discriminatory practice." Thus, appreciating
the preference of many senior citizens to live in retirement com-
munities without children, the FHAA exempted from its scope
"housing for older persons."2 This exemption protected the rights
of seniors to choose to live in communities with people their own
age.
33
Under the legislation, a housing unit could qualify for this
exemption in one of three ways. First, the unit could qualify if it
was a state or federally-funded housing project that was
"specifically designed and operated to assist elderly persons. " '
The second qualification could be satisfied by those housing
communities intended for persons at least sixty-two years of age
and occupied solely by them. 5 Third, a community could qualify
if it was "intended and operated for occupancy by at least one
person fifty-five years of age or older per unit."36
For a housing facility to qualify for exemption under the
third method, it was required to meet three additional criteria.
First, such housing had to offer "significant facilities and serv-
ices specifically designed to meet the physical or social needs of
older persons."37 Second, at least eighty percent of the units had
3' See S. REP. NO. 104-172, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 782
(recognizing that seniors should be allowed to live in peaceful, safe, congenial com-
munities).
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1994).
"See 141 CONG. REC. H14967 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Frank).
"42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(A).
3" See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(B) (1994). Critics of the 62 or older qualification
argue that the FHAA may actually encourage discrimination of anyone under the
age of 62 because the federal law will supersede all local laws that prohibit age dis-
crimination. See Harry Wood, Age-bias Act Voids Local Law, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1989, at 12H, available in 1989 WL 6585044. The FHAA actually
renders these local laws "meaningless and unenforceable." Id.; see also H.R. REP.
No. 104-91, at 11 (1995) (quoting Acting Assistant Attorney General Kent Markus,
who referred to communities that qualify for the exemption through this require-
ment as "de facto retirement communities").
"42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C).
' 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(i) (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(i)
(Supp. 1998). If a housing provider found it impracticable to provide "significant
facilities and services" then it could still qualify for the exemption through the third
exemption if it were shown that "the provision of such facilities and services [was]
not practicable, [and] that such housing [was] necessary to provide important
housing opportunities for older persons." Id. The amendment no longer includes this
provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 1998). "This alternative was created
for 'those unusual circumstances where housing without such facilities and services
[73:273
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to be occupied by someone who was a minimum of fifty-five years
of age.3" Third, the manager or owner of the housing complex
was required to publish and adhere to policies and procedures
demonstrative of an intent to provide housing for persons of at
least fifty-five years of age.3 9
However, the "significant facilities and services" standard
produced many problems for retirement communities trying to
qualify for the "housing for older persons" exemption. There
were no clear regulations describing what type of facilities and
services were needed.0 Residents considering selling their units
were uncertain which applicants they could accept or reject be-
cause they did not know whether their condominium or coopera-
provides important housing opportunities for older persons.'" Secretary ex rel. Law-
son v. TEMS Ass'n, No. HUDALJ 04-91-0064-1, 1992 WL 400528, at *11 (H.U.D.
Apr. 9, 1992) (quoting 134 CONG. REC. S10456) (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988)); see also
Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232,
3257 (1989) (providing guidance for the interpretation of the exemption based upon
statements of Representative Edwards asserting that the exemption is not to be in-
terpreted broadly and will not be satisfied merely because services and facilities are
expensive or impracticable).
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. 1998). There were several purposes recognized by Congress
in allowing 20% of the units to be occupied solely by persons under the age of 55.
One purpose was to protect those persons younger than 55 when a spouse or other
member of the household over the age of 55 dies or leaves the unit. See Implemen-
tation of the Fair Housing Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3255 (1989) (considering
the legislative history of the provision and reviewing the opinions of commentators).
It also protects incoming households, including, for example, those under the age of
55 who inherit a condominium from a loved one. See id. However, practical concerns
preclude an owner from setting aside exactly 20% of the units. See id. Were an
owner to attempt this, a significant risk of losing the exemption would arise if the
over-55 resident in one of the units died, leaving only person(s) under the age of 55.
See id.
o See 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (b)(2)(C)(iii) (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 3607
(b)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. 1998). The only way the housing facility may be occupied by per-
sons who fail to meet the age requirements and still qualify for the "housing for
older persons" exemption is if those occupants lived in the complex prior to Septem-
ber 13, 1988, and if the new occupants meet the restrictions. See 42 U.S.C. §
3607(b)(3)(A); see also Harry Wood, "For Sale" Signs Can Be Nixed, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, June 4, 1989, at 4H, available in 1989 WL 6605353 (describing residents not
subject to the Act because of their occupancy prior to this date as "grandfathered").
Furthermore, unoccupied units may qualify for the exemption if they are reserved
for persons who meet the age restrictions. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (b)(3)(B).
0' See S. REP No. 104-172, at 2-3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778,
779-80 ("For the last 7 years, it has been unclear what the phrase 'significant facili-
ties and services' means. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) regulations have not been sufficiently clear or helpful.").
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tive was exempt from the statute.4 "Nobody, including the Gov-
ernment, [could] figure out what the phrase 'significant facilities
and services' mean[t] ."42
The absence of clear regulations by HUD resulted in a nar-
row construction of the exemption.' In an effort to prevent
housing discrimination, there was a consistent belief that
"[elxemptions from the Fair Housing Act [were] to be construed
narrowly."" An investigation conducted by the legal counsel of
the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) proved that
no housing facility had qualified for the exemption when as-
serted as a defense against a claim of housing discrimination."
41 See, e.g., Judy Garnatz, Condominium Owner Can Challenge An Age Re-
quirement, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at 4, available in 1990 WL 8079102
(advising a condominium owner that his only recourse was to challenge the age re-
quirement); Harry Wood, Only Courts Can Rule On Age Bias Series: Condominiums,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 23, 1989, at 12H, available in 1989 WL 6792144
(illustrating the uncertainty of condominium owners in this regard by having to an-
swer a resident's questions as to whether his cooperative was exempt from the Act);
see also Walt Albro, Danger Zone: 55 and Over, TODAY'S REALTOR, Apr. 1, 1996, at
26 (noting that the confusion was a problem for realtors in areas with high concen-
trations of elderly and age-restrictive homes).
42 S. REP. No. 104-172, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 781; see
also Panel Approves Bill To Protect Housing For Seniors, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.,
Aug. 5, 1995, at 2378 (recognizing legislators' concerns regarding the uncertainty of
what housing qualifies for the exemption).
4" Age-restricted condominiums also were having trouble securing the exemp-
tion because the age and status of their residents were continuously changing, with
the result that residents would be eligible one year, but not the next. See Andree
Brooks, Condo Age Limits Running Into Problems, STAR TRIB. NEWS (Minneapolis-
St. Paul), Dec. 29, 1990, at 3R, available in 1990 WL 5351905. Less than 25% of the
age-restricted condominiums were qualifying for the exemption. See id.
"Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, 3 F.3d 1472, 1475 (11th Cir.
1993) (considering the minimum 16-year age-requirement of a Florida residential
community); see also United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir.
1994) (concluding that the "significant facilities and services" requirement would not
be satisfied if the community's only service, specifically-tailored to the needs of sen-
iors, was visits by health care officials); Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 978-
79 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that of the few courts that had considered the exemption,
none had found the amendments to be applicable), abrogated on other grounds by
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995); Housing for Older Per-
sons; Defining Significant Facilities and Services; Proposed Amendments, 59 Fed.
Reg. 34,902, 34,903 (1994) (expressing the Department's belief that the FHA
"impose[d] a strict burden," that required all claimants of the exemption to "provide
credible and objective evidence").
* See H.R. REP. No. 104-91, at 4-5 (1995); see also S. REP. NO. 104-172, at 9
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 785 (views of Sen. Kyl) (" 'IL]awyers
could not find a single instance in which a senior community was able to defend suc-
cessfully against a challenge to its exempt status ... [t]his was not supposed to be
an impossible test but to sort out the facilities that were really for older persons
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This had the potential to destroy many of the nation's 26,000
age-restricted condominiums.' Furthermore, it resulted in se-
vere financial problems for some board members because some
residential associations did not cover their members for personal
liability.4
7
HUD attempted to define "services and facilities" with a
non-exclusive list. 8 The list, however, provided only minimum
guidance because it focused on services and facilities for the dis-
abled. 9 Commentators began questioning whether housing
communities without services and facilities for the disabled could
qualify for the exemption.0 Both the federal courts and adminis-
trative law judges ("ALJs")5' began equating "older living" with
from those that merely wanted to exclude children.' ") (quoting Rules Changing for
Seniors-Only Housing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 1995, at J1, available in 1995
WL 6431400).
46 See Brooks, supra note 43.
17 See id.; see also Biondi v. Demou, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 229 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(awarding a rejected cooperative applicant punitive damages against individual
board members, and explaining that, under the FHA, there is no limitation on the
amount of punitive damages that may be awarded for discriminatory conduct).
48 The list included: social and recreational programs, continuing education, in-
formation, an accessible physical environment, emergency and preventive health
care programs, congregate dining facilities, transportation to facilitate access to so-
cial services, counseling, recreational, homemaker, outside maintenance, and refer-
ral services, and other assistance designed to encourage and help residents to use
the services and facilities available to them. See Housing for Older Persons; Defin-
ing Significant Facilities and Services; Proposed Amendments, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,902,
34,942 (1994); see also Hayward, 36 F.3d at 837 (discussing the "services and facili-
ties" list and explicitly recognizing that a facility need not have all of the listed fea-
tures to qualify for the exemption).
"9 See Housing for Older Persons; Defining Significant Facilities and Services;
Proposed Amendments, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,902, 34,941-42 (1994).
"See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed.
Reg. 3232, 3256 (1989) (explaining that many commentators incorrectly believed
that paragraph (b)(1) of the FHAA required facilities and services of such a quality
as "what one might expect to find in a facility for severely disabled elderly persons
who are not able to care for themselves"); see also Carl A.S. Coan, Jr. & Sheila C.
Salmon, The Fair Housing Act And Seniors' Housing, 27 URB. LAW. 826, 828-29
(1995) (elucidating HUD's response to the large number of comments and inquiries).
5' Complaints for housing discrimination can be administratively filed through
HUD or proceed through the federal courts. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1994); see also
170 W. 85 St. HDFC v. Jones, 673 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1998)
(noting that the administrative law judges possess a specialized knowledge of
housing discrimination because they are more accustomed to handling such com-
plaints). As a practical matter, awards by ALJs are less generous than one might
hope. See Edward Allen, Six Years After Passage of the Fair Housing Amendments
Act: Discrimination Against Families With Children, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 297, 342-
44 (1995) (observing that ALJs typically base damages on objective factors that will
not deter discrimination or compensate victims for their deprivation of civil rights).
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debilitation.52 The services and facilities had to be " 'designed,
constructed, or adapted to meet the particularized needs of older
persons.' " The fact that a community was not designed for
children did not automatically qualify it as "housing for older
persons." It could not satisfy the exemption if it merely provided
amenities that any housing community could provide to its resi-
dents.'
For example, in Secretary ex rel. Bellfy v. Ocean Parks Jupi-
ter Condominium Assn,55 a condominium complex could not
12 See, e.g., United States v. Keck, No. Civ.A. C89-1664-C, 1990 WL 357064, at
*5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 1990); Secretary ex rel. Bellfy v. Ocean Parks Jupiter Con-
dominium Ass'n, No. HUDALJ 04-90-0589-1, 1993 WL 316543, at *30 (H.U.D. Aug.
20, 1993) (noting that older persons have additional leisure time as well as in-
creased physical limitations and health problems). However, state statutes, which
followed the language of the federal act, were often not construed to identify the
elderly with the handicapped. See, e.g., Huntington Landmark Adult Community
Ass'n, v. Ross, 261 Cal. Rptr. 875, 878 (Ct. App. 1989) (expressly rejecting the con-
tention that the physical needs of the handicapped and the elderly are one in the
same).
Ocean Parks, 1993 WL 316543, at *30 (quoting Secretary ex rel. Fallon v.
Murphy, No. HUDALJ 02-89-0202-1 (H.U.D. July 13, 1990); see also Keck, 1990 WL
357064, at *3-*5 ([A] housing provider must offer its tenants a package of facilities
and services that indicates a genuine commitment to serving the special needs of
older persons."); Murphy, 1990 WL 456962, at *35-*36 (finding that the lack of social
programs offered at a mobile park home, the absence of fixtures for handicapped in
the rest rooms, the inability of a handicapped person to enter the clubhouse, and the
presence of gutters near the sidewalks, that proved to be obstacles for wheelchairs,
contributed to the inability of the park to qualify for the exemption); Secretary ex
rel. Lawson v. TEMS Ass'n, No. HUDAIJ 04-91-0064-1, 1992 WL 400528, at *9-*10
(H.U.D. Apr. 9, 1992) (declaring that a community of single-family homes could not
qualify for the exemption because its services and facilities were even more inade-
quate than those found in Murphy); Housing for Older Persons; Defining Significant
Facilities and Services; Proposed Amendments, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,902, 34,903 (1994).
See generally Coan & Salmon, supra note 50, at 829-32 (analyzing Murphy, TEMS,
and other decisions which held that the parties did not qualify for the exemption).
" See Park Place Home Brokers v. P-K Mobile Home Park, 773 F. Supp. 46, 51-
52 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (recognizing that any landlord might remove snow and provide
the service of a van which transported residents to social services and programs);
see also United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that services, such as a sauna, shuffle board court, reading room, taxi service to
one's door, monthly blood pressure and glaucoma exams, an annual physical exam,
and the administration of flu shots, were not significant enough to provide exemp-
tion status); Housing for Older Persons; Defining Significant Facilities and Services;
Proposed Amendments, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,902, 34,905 (1994).
No. HUDALJ 04-90-0589-1, 1993 WL 316543 (H.U.D. Aug. 20, 1993). See gen-
erally Elena R. Minicucci, Note, Housing For Older Persons Exemption in the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988: Can Mr. Wilson Really Stop Dennis the Menace




qualify as "housing for older persons" because it was not aimed
at providing amenities for the elderly." Wheelchair ramps were
provided, but they were not available for individual units in the
condominium, and the bathrooms were not accessible to the dis-
abled. 7 Sidewalks were not provided throughout the community
and the gravel paths that existed were not well lit. 8 Further-
more, the residential association did not hire an activity coordi-
nator.59
The economic effects of this rule were disastrous. Housing
communities were being forced to provide additional services and
facilities, thereby creating financial burdens on their residents
and discouraging future applicants. 0 The increase in payments
was extremely difficult for seniors living on fixed incomes.61
Ironically, in 1992, in Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp,62
it was determined that the provision was not unconstitutionally
vague.' Although the district court acknowledged that it was
very difficult to determine what the phrase meant," the statutes
and regulations were deemed to have satisfied due process.'
They were not vague, but simply "flexible."66 On appeal the
Eleventh Circuit agreed and found that, together, the statutes
and regulations provided enough information to enable a com-
See Ocean Parks, 1993 WL 316543, at *31.
6 See id.
s See id.
r9 See id. at *32. The association maintained the coordinator position as a volun-
teer post and, thus, had difficulty keeping it filled. See id.
£ See H.R. REP. No. 104-91, at 3 (1995).
6' See id.
6 761 F. Supp. 1528 (M.D. Fla. 1991), affd, 965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1992). The
condominium facility at issue failed to qualify for the exemption because it had not
published or adhered to policies or procedures that would demonstrate an intent to
provide housing for persons at least 55 years of age. See Seniors Civil Liberties
Ass'n, 965 F.2d at 1033.
63 In addition to asserting that the provision was unconstitutionally vague, the
seniors argued that the amendments were unconstitutional because they violated
the Commerce Clause, the states' power under the Tenth Amendment, the right of
association, the right of privacy, and the right to equal protection under the law. See
id. at 1033; see also Shelley D. Cutts, Comment, The Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988: An Incomplete Solution to the Problem of Housing Discrimination Against
Families, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 205, 210-17 (1998) (discussing the district court's decision
as to each claim that the amendments were unconstitutional and criticizing the out-
come).
r See Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, 761 F. Supp. at 1553-54 (analyzing the non-
exclusive list set forth by HUD).
c See id. at 1555.
See id. (noting that the legislative history indicated "[filexibility is the key").
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munity to conform to the requirements.6 7
In 1995, HUD proposed new rules that rejected the stereo-
type that every older person was disabled." Under the new
rules, a housing community could "self-certify" that it qualified
for the over-55-exemption.69 The purpose behind the self-
certification was to permit communities to ascertain with confi-
dence whether or not they qualified for the exemption." There-
fore, HUD set forth "a 'menu' of facilities and services" from
which each housing community could choose.7' To qualify, the
residential community had to provide at least two facilities or
services from five of twelve categories, for a total of ten facilities
or services.
2
Although this method of self-certification seemed acceptable,
Congress questioned whether it would withstand judicial analy-
sis. First, Congress was concerned that some of the facilities and
services listed were of the type that any landlord would provide,
rather than facilities designed specifically for seniors." Second,
Congress worried whether these facilities and services rose to
the level of significance needed to qualify for the exemption in
' See Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, 965 F.2d at 1036.
See Housing for Older Persons; Defining Significant Facilities and Services;
Proposed Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,840, 13,841 (1995) (recognizing that most
seniors are healthy individuals that lead active lives). The proposed rules did not
require that the amenities be designed to meet the needs of older, disabled persons.
See id. For example, a housing community could qualify for the exemption without
providing nursing services or congregate dining areas. See id.
69 See id. The Department would assume that communities that were self-
certified were in compliance with the Act's requirements. See id.
70 See Housing For Older Persons; Defining Significant Facilities and Services;
Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,322, 43,326 (1995).
71 See id. at 43,322. HUD did not revise the proposed self-certification rule, de-
spite criticism from commentators. See id. at 43,326.
The 12 categories included services and facilities designed to accommodate
older persons' social, educational, physical, health, transportation, and leisure
needs. See Housing for Older Persons; Defining Significant Facilities and Services;
Proposed Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,841, 13,843-44. These categories encom-
passed: social and recreational services provided on a regular and organized basis,
continuing education activities, information and counseling services, homemaker
services, outside maintenance/health and safety services, emergency and preventa-
tive health care programs, congregate dining, transportation to facilitate access to
social services, services to encourage and assist residents in using available facilities
and services, social and recreational facilities, an accessible physical environment,
and any other facility or service designed to meet the needs of older persons (age 55
or older). See id.
73 See H.R. REP. No. 104-91, at 4 (1995).
[73:273
AGE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
the eyes of the courts.74 Finally, these regulations seemed to
benefit the rich, who were the only ones able to afford such fa-
cilities and services.'
In fact, the provision of "significant facilities and services,"
as proposed by HUD in 1995, proved to be a "disaster."76 After
15,219 letters and comments, Congress was forced to amend the
act and eliminate the requirement of "significant services and
facilities."77 Elimination of the controversial phrase provided the
courts with better direction in determining which senior housing
qualifies for the exemption, without hurting older persons fi-
nancially.7 The decrease in litigation also saves the taxpayers
thousands of dollars.79 As amended, "housing for older persons"
7 See id. Congress identified services and facilities as "significant" by the
overall number, as well as in terms of use by the elderly. See id.
See id. at 3 (noting low-income seniors cannot afford the costs of additional
services); 141 CONG. REC. S18065 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Brown)
(noting that the "HUD designed guidelines that, for the normal seniors in this coun-
try, became exorbitantly expensive."). But see Housing for Older Persons; Defining
Significant Facilities and Services; Proposed Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,841
(noting that the proposed regulations accommodate regional differences, and differ-
ences stemming from the nature and cost of housing and, thus, are not limited to
the affluent); Housing for Older Persons; Defining Significant Facilities and Serv-
ices; Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,324, 43,324 (noting that the scope of the menu
was broad enough to cover all types of senior housing "without undue burden or ex-
pense").
7" See S. REP. No. 104-172, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 781;
141 CONG. REC. S18064 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Brown) (noting
that the provision was a "pain in the neck" because its vagueness had created liti-
gation and caused confusion).
See Housing for Older Persons; Defining Significant Facilities and Services;
Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,322, 43,322 (1995). Based on written comments and
comments received at five public meetings held around the country, HUD decided to
change the proposed rule.
The 1995 amendment also created a "good faith exemption" that shields per-
sons accused of familial status discrimination if they reasonably relied on the belief
that a housing community qualified for exemption under the provision. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 1997).
7" Senator Jon Kyl noted that the 1995 proposed rules by HUD would affect both
low and wealthy income communities. See S. REP. No. 104-172, at 10. The lower in-
come communities would be affected through an inability to pay for additional serv-
ices such as bowling trips, tai-chi classes, and pet therapy for residents' animals. See
id. The wealthier income communities would be affected through developers' reluc-
tance to build senior communities in the future. See id. Developers believe that the
regulations would destroy any desire by older persons to live in either of these
communities. See id
79 See id. at 5 (noting that the provision's uncertainty creates a threat of litiga-
tion). But see id. at 7 (noting that while the amendment could lead to a reduction in
the number of lawsuits brought before the DOJ or HUD regarding "housing for older
persons," it is not expected that the bill will cause a significant decrease in the costs
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means housing:
(A) provided under any State or Federal program that the Sec-
retary determines is specifically designed and operated to assist
elderly persons... ; or
(B) intended for, and solely occupied by, persons 62 years of age
or older, or
(C) intended and operated for occupancy by persons 55 years of
age or older, and-
(i) at least 80 percent of the occupied units are occupied by at
least one person who is 55 years of age or older;
(ii) the housing facility or community publishes and adheres to
policies and procedures that demonstrate the intent required
under this subparagraph; and
(iii) the housing facility or community complies with rules is-
sued by the Secretary for verification of occupancy, which
shall-
(I) provide for verification by reliable surveys and affidavits;
and
(II) include examples of the types of policies and procedures
relevant to a determination of compliance with the requirement
of clause (ii). Such surveys and affidavits shall be admissible in
administrative and judicial proceedings for the purposes of such
verification.
80
Critics of this amendment argued that it undermines the
purpose of protecting families with children. Senator Joseph
Biden argued that to qualify for the exemption more than mere
animosity toward children should be necessary.8' Senior resi-
dences should remain distinguishable from other residences by
retaining certain characteristics that communities occupied by
children did not provide. 2 Furthermore, by relaxing the re-
quirement for services and facilities, the housing complex would
not have to provide any amenities and could still be exempted
from the FHAA with more than fifty percent of its residents
younger than fifty-five years of age.' Nevertheless, the confus-
incurred by these agencies).
42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1997)81 See S. REP. NO. 104-172, at 15.
See id.
83 See id. at 16. For example, take a 100 unit complex with two occupants per
unit and 80% of the 100 units (80 units) being occupied by one person aged 55 or
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ing phrase, "significant services and facilities," was the only
provision deleted under the 1995 amendments.
I. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AMENDMENTS APPLIED TO
CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES
The Fair Housing Act Amendments have affected thousands
of people and will continue to do so in the years to come." In
1997, there were 32,951,000 families with children under eight-
een; that number is predicted to remain approximately the same
for the next ten years. By 1990, half of the complaints filed
with HUD alleged discrimination based upon familial status.86
By September, 1992, familial status was alleged as the basis of
discrimination in 7,613 complaints filed with HUD, constituting
23.6 percent of the total number of complaints filed for that pe-
riod.87
older. See i& Out of 200 occupants, 80 persons can be 55 or older compared to 120
persons younger than 55. See id- This standard allows 60% of the population to defy
the age requirement while allowing the housing community to keep families with
children out. See id.
In the past fiscal year, HUD obtained $9.6 million in settlements for victims
seeking relief for housing discrimination. See Cuomo Announces Las Vegas Builder
to Pay Settlement for Disability Housing Discrimination Complaint, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, May 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5685462. This is an increase of $5.2
million from the year before. See id. As part of President Clinton's One American
Initiative, his proposed federal budget for 1999 seeks to distribute $22 million in in-
creased funding to combat housing discrimination. See id. This increase would en-
able HUD's office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity to spend $52 million in its
efforts to fight discrimination, and would result in the largest budget increase for
the grotection of civil right in two decades. See id.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1997, at 59, tbl.67 (1997) (predicting that the number of
families with children under 18 will be 33,001,000 in 1998; 33,058,000 in 1999;
33,117,000 in 2000; 32,699,000 in 2005; 32,203,000 in 2010).
6' See Allen, supra note 51, at 303. More complaints were filed with state or lo-
cal agencies based on familial status discrimination than any other protected class,
except for race. See id. (citing OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FAIR HOUS. &
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & UR3AN DEVELOPMENT, 1993
CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAIR HOUSING PROGRAMS, 13-14
(1995). From 1992 through 1993, 26% of all complaints filed with HUD alleged fa-
milial discrimination. By 1994, the agency found that there was reasonable cause to
find familial status discrimination in two-thirds of the complaints submitted. See ic.
(citing Chief Administrative Law Judge Alan Heifetz); see also John M. Payne, En-
forcing the New Fair Housing Act, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 151, 156-57 (1990) (expressing
doubt as to whether the federal government will allocate the resources necessary to
combat discrimination based on the backlog of complaints at the HUD soon after the
passage of the 1988 amendments).
"See S. REP. No. 103-40(11), at 281 (1993). By October, 1992, HUD received
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The FHAA's effect on condominiums and cooperatives is cur-
rently a growing concern since both types of housing communi-
ties are quickly increasing at a substantial rate and are now
more affordable than in past years.m By 1990, there was an in-
crease of nearly 2.6 million condominiums, as compared to the
previous decade.89 From 1984 to 1995, the number of coopera-
tives in New York increased from 247,000 to 416,000.90 This is
extremely significant because 95% of the cooperatives found
within the United States are located in New York.91 In today's
housing market, a drop in sales of coops or condos in a certain
region is more likely the result of unavailability and not due to a
lack of interest.
9 2
A. Condominiums and Cooperatives Are Covered Within the
Scope of the Fair Housing Act Amendments
There is no doubt that the FHAA covers both condominiums
and cooperatives.93 A dwelling is defined as, "any building, struc-
ture, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or in-
20,000 complaints. See S. REP. No. 104-172, at 5. Of these complaints, 17,000 were
closed that year, resulting in over $7 million in penalties. See id.
8 See Michael A. Wolff, Comment, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988:
A Critical Analysis of "Familial Status," 54 MO. L. REV. 393, 394 (1989) (predicting
that the FHAA would have its greatest impact on rental housing and condominiums
since most discrimination against families with children occurs in such places).
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL BRIEF, CONDOMINIUMS (1994). The
regions that were affected most dramatically were the South, with an increase of
nearly one million, and the Northeast, with an increase of over 700,000. See id.
(listing a breakdown of the number of condominiums in each state). See Brooks, su-
pra note 43 (noting that age-restricted condominiums are flourishing in New Jersey,
Connecticut, Florida, California, and Arizona).
90 See Rosemarie Maldonado & Robert D. Rose, The Application of Civil Rights
Laws to Housing Cooperatives: Are Co-ops Bastions of Discriminatory Exclusion or
Self-Selecting Models of Community Based Living?, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1245,
1246 (1996) (citing N.R. Kleinfield & Tracie Rozhan, In Flat Market, Co-op Life Has
Ups and Downs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al (chart as corrected on Nov. 2,
1995)).
91 See id. at 124647 (giving an overview of the housing market in New York).
See Adrienne Albert, Residential Sales Market Turns Around, REAL EST.
WELY., June 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9288310 (noting that a 12.6% decrease
of sales in condominiums in Manhattan, as compared to a 12.9% gain in cooperative
sales, was a result of the condominium market's inability to keep up with consumer
demands).
See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972)




tended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families."'
During the passage of the FHAA, some commentators argued
that cooperatives, condominiums, and mobile home parks were
not dwellings.95 Congress, however, wanted the Act to be inter-
preted as broadly as possible.' Therefore, HUD responded by
stating that the definition of a "dwelling" is "clearly broad
enough to cover.., mobile home parks, trailers, courts, condo-
miniums, cooperatives, and time-sharing properties."97 The
regulations do not provide any specific examples as to what con-
stitutes a dwelling because of a fear that such a list would be
construed as exhaustive.98
Administrative agencies' interpretations of statutes have
always been given a great deal of deference." Accordingly, the
courts have followed the advice of HUD and construed the defi-
nition of a "dwelling" to include both cooperatives and condo-
miniums.' Furthermore, the word "any" has always received a
04 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (b) (1994).
's See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed.
Reg. 3232, 3238 (1989).
See i& (stating that the statutory definition of "dwelling" is broad).
' kL; see also Louisiana Acorn Fair Hous. v. Quarter House, 952 F. Supp. 352,
358 (E.D. La. 1997) (construing the definition of the term "dwelling" based on the
HUD's statements); Implementation of the Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995,
62 Fed. Reg. 2000, 2002 (1997) (noting that a "dwelling" includes a condominium as-
sociation or cooperative for purposes of the Act).
'8 "[Tihe need to leave open the extent and scope of the terms defined in the
Fair Housing Act outweighs the need to provide comprehensive examples in con-
nection with this rulemaking." Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. at 3238. Subject to certain restrictions, however, single-
family houses sold or rented by the owner are exempt from the provisions of the Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1994).
93 See Louisiana Acorn Fair Hous., 952 F. Supp. at 358 (providing examples of
Supreme Court and Circuit Court cases that construed statutes according to the
construction provided by administrative agencies).
10 See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1979)
(finding that the definition of a "dwelling" under the Act includes cooperatives);
United States v. Tropic Seas Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1359 (D. Haw. 1995) ("A coop-
erative apartment building is a 'dwelling' within the meaning of the Fair Housing
Act."); Kemp, 761 F. Supp. at 1543 (concluding that the scope of the Act covers both
the sale and rental of condominiums, single-family homes, and mobile homes).
A dwelling has also been construed to include "summer bungalows, farm labor
camps, an AIDS hospice, a childrens' home, a homeless shelter, [and] a nursing
home." Louisiana Acorn Fair Hous., 952 F. Supp. at 359 (footnotes omitted). Motels
have not been considered dwellings. See id. In making this determination, the major
factors considered are: the length of time a person stays at the place in question and
whether there is an intent to return. See id.
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broad construction by the courts.1"'
The FHAA also applies to residential associations 2 which
grants them the ability to qualify for the "housing for older per-
sons" exemption. In Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic
Ass'n,"'0 the residential association attempted to evict a family
with an infant because the by-laws restricted occupancy to per-
sons over the age of sixteen.' In 1990, the association amended
its by-laws to restrict occupancy to persons over the age of fifty-
five and attempted to evict another family with children. 5
There was an issue as to whether the residential association
could qualify for the exemption because the amendments of 1988
were based upon the actions and intentions of owners and man-
agers.0 6 This particular association did not own, rent, or lease
any of the dwellings, and did not advertise vacancies to attract
future applicants. 10 7  The Eleventh Circuit, however, declared
that the entity did qualify for the exemption because the asso-
ciation's power to enforce the declaration and exclude persons
from the community was similar to that of a manager or
owner."8 Furthermore, because residential associations are not
expressly excluded from the FHAA, the court determined that
Congress had intended for them to be within its scope." 9 Addi-
tionally, since the 1995 amendments to the "housing for older
persons" exemption are not based upon the actions of owners and
'ol See Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 192 U.S. 73, 81 (1904) (noting that there are no
limitations when an exemption is defined by the word "any"); see also City of Ed-
monds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 739 n.1 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(noting broad construction of the word "any" as applied to an interpretation of
ERISA and stating that "[a] broad interpretation of the word 'any' is hardly novel").
102 See Bill Miller, D.C. Condo Owners To Pay for Member's Racial Insults,
WASHINGTON POST, June 10, 1998, at A01 (noting that a court's ruling upholding a
condominium residents right to sue the association signaled that the FHA applied
to condominium associations).
1 03 3 F.3d 1472 (11th Cir. 1993).
104 See id. at 1474-75. The Mainlands was a residential community of approxi-
mately 530 single-family homes owned in fee simple by each resident. See id.
101 See id. at 1475. The Mirabile family also received a letter from the Associa-
tion informing them of the violation of the age restriction due to the presence of an
infant daughter. See id.
'0 See id. at 1477; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(iii) (1994 & Supp. 1997)
(changing language to apply to any "housing facility"). The residential association
has the burden of proving its eligibility for the exemption. See Massaro, 3 F.3d at
1475.





managers but rather the "housing community,"" there is no
question that the broader definition encompasses residential as-
sociations.
Legislative history shows that Congress never intended to
deny communities the right to the exemption simply because
they had pre-existing age limitations lower than the age of fifty-
five."' As Senator Ted Kennedy noted, it is possible for the
community to qualify for the exemption as long as any pre-
existing age limitation is enforced in a manner consistent with
the FHAA." Therefore, the community must illustrate that it
had intended its housing to be for older persons."' However, the
fact that the restriction existed at a time prior to the enactment
of the FHAA was, by itself, insufficient to demonstrate such an
intent." If it were sufficient, then any preexisting age restric-
tion would bring a community out of the Act and virtually de-
stroy the protection afforded to families with children."5  The
residential association in Massaro could not qualify for the ex-
emption because policies and procedures were not in place to
demonstrate an intent to house older persons."6
In Westwood Community Two Ass'n v. Lewis,"7 the declara-
tions of restrictions, recorded in 1972, limited occupancy in the
condominium to persons over the age of sixteen and declared
that this restriction was to run with the land until the year
2022." Similar to the Federal Act, Florida's Fair Housing Act
was amended in 1989 to prevent discrimination based upon fa-
milial status, thus voiding the condominium's age restrictions.
In response to the amendment, the "[residential] association
amended its by-laws in an [effort] to fit within the 'housing for
"0 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(c)(ii) (Supp. 1997) ("The housing facility or community
publishes and adheres to policies and procedures that demonstrate the intent re-
quired under this subparagraph.").
,' See Massaro, 3 F.3d at 1479.
112 See ida (quoting 134 CONG. REC. S10549 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988).
"1 See id
114 See id.
"s See id. ("The declaration's restriction on residency by children cannot show
that the community intended its housing to be for older persons because then any
policy against families would suffice for the exemption, swallowing the rule against
such discrimination.").116 See id.
11 687 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
118 See id at 297.
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older persons' exemption." 9
The residential association acted without authority because
the by-laws amendment was found to have conflicted with the
declarations. ° More importantly, the court held that a residen-
tial association could not simply amend its by-laws because an
age restriction was invalidated by the state amendments of
1989. '12 Utilizing the same reasoning found in Massaro, the
court held that pre-existing age restrictions, standing alone,
were insufficient evidence to prove that the condominium in-
tended to provide housing for older persons and, therefore, were
inconsistent with the state statute.22
B. Broad Grants of Standing Under the FHA
Under the Fair Housing Act, any "aggrieved person" may
bring a discrimination claim. An "[a]ggrieved person" is defined
as, "any person who-(1) claims to have been injured by a dis-
criminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person
will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about
to occur." It includes corporations, fair housing organizations,
trustees, testers, legal representatives, and the Secretary of
HUD.
1 24
The Supreme Court has interpreted standing under the FHA
to be as broad as Article III of the United States Constitution
will permit, thus allowing claims to be brought by persons ordi-
119 Id.
120 See id. (quoting the by-laws as stating " '[n]o amendment shall be made
which is in conflict with the Declaration of Restrictions' ").
121 See id. at 297-98.
122 See id. at 298.
'2 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (1994). Once the discriminatory practice ends, the com-
plainant is no longer "aggrieved." United States v. Melody Lakes Country Club Es-
tates, No. Civ. A. 94-1219, 1994 WL 708218, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 1994) (stating
that individuals who had paid a surcharge in a trailer park, for having in excess of
two people per trailer, were no longer "aggrieved" when the discriminatory practice
ended).
124 See F. Willis Caruso & William H. Jones, Fair Housing in the 1990's: An
Overview of Recent Developments and Prognosis Of Their Impact, 22 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 421, 434 (1989). A fair housing agency can also establish standing under the
FHA by simply showing that the agency spent its time and its money either counsel-
ing or directing its efforts towards ending discrimination against a particular hous-
ing community. See Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir.
1990). Further, in cases involving discriminatory practices, the Seventh Circuit has
allowed the addition of aggrieved persons after a complaint has already been filed.
See United States v. Stanec, 914 F. Supp. 322, 323 n.1 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
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narily barred by the prudential rules of standing.' The only re-
quirement necessary for standing is that the claimant have suf-
fered "minima of injury in fact."" This is established by evidenc-
ing "a distinct and palpable injury" that is traceable to the
defendant's conduct.'
It is clear that standing under the act does not require
membership in the protected class.' A non-class member has
standing to challenge a discriminatory practice as an "aggrieved
person" if two elements are shown. He or she must have suf-
fered actual injury that was proximately caused by discrimina-
tory acts against a protected class member and challenge the
discriminatory policy on behalf of a class member."
This implies that the FHAA are intended to provide protec-
tion for persons who own a condominium or cooperative where
the by-laws or lease contains a restrictive covenant denying oc-
cupancy to families with children. These covenants thereby
shrink the number of potential qualified buyers, and conse-
quently restrict the ability of such owners to sell their housing
units. Of course, the residential association can raise the af-
12 See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (noting that
standing extends to the limit of Article I); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 & n.9 (1979) (same); Trafficante Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (holding that standing under the FHA extends to the limits
of the Constitution); see also Halet v. Wend Investment Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1308-09
(9th Cir. 1982) (noting that a Caucasian man did not have standing under the Four-
teenth Amendment or the Civil Rights statutes to challenge racial discrimination
against African Americans and Hispanics through housing policy, but did have
standing under the FRA).
126 Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 372.
Id. (quoting Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 460, 501 (1975)).
12 See Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 103 n.9 (allowing non-minority members
of a village to sue under the FHA because discriminatory sales deprived them of a
racially-integrated community); Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208-12 (finding that white
tenants had standing under the Act to sue a landlord who discriminated against mi-
norities because the white tenants were deprived of social benefits, business oppor-
tunities, and professional advantages, and were forced to suffer the stigmatization
of being "residents of a 'white ghetto' "); see also Simovits v. Chanticleer Condomin-
ium Ass'n, 933 F. Supp. 1394, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff did not
have to be a victim of the discrimination to have standing to sue).
'2 See Wasserman v. Three Seasons Ass'n No. 1, 998 F. Supp. 1445, 1447 (S.D.
Fla. 1998) (observing that the FHAA protects those persons whose daily activities
will be affected by the practices of a housing community, as well as those at whom
the discrimination is directed); see also Gorski v. Troy, 929 F.2d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir.
1991) (reasoning that foster parents obtained standing under the FHAA despite the
fact that they never obtained legal custody of children during the occupancy, be-
cause they suffered injury when evicted).
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firmative defense that the housing community qualifies under
the "housing for older persons" exemption, however, it has been
illustrated that residents without "familial status" can also be
protected by the Act.
For example, in Simovits v. Chanticleer Condominium Asso-
ciation,1 30 the condominium by-laws restricted occupancy to per-
sons eighteen years or older, absent consent from the Board of
Managers. When the plaintiffs attempted to sell their condomin-
ium, they were forced to decline two offers because both potential
applicants had minor children. After reducing the price of the
condominium by $42,500, a childless couple purchased it after
receiving consent from the Board of Managers. The plaintiffs
sued the residential association for their financial loss.'3'
Although the plaintiffs had not been directly discriminated
against by the covenant in the condominium by-laws, the court
held that standing was established.12  The plaintiffs were not
part of the protected class, but were still afforded protection from
the discriminatory practices of the residential association. The
alleged financial loss and emotional injury constituted a "distinct
and palpable injury" arising from the inability to sell the con-
dominium at a higher price and the need to make additional
mortgage payments."3 The reduction in value of the condomin-
ium and the subsequent financial loss were traceable to the as-
sociation's discriminatory conduct in enforcing the restrictive
covenant that caused the loss of potential buyers with children
under the age of eighteen."
However, standing by a non-class member cannot be estab-
lished under the FHAA unless there is some relationship be-
tween the actual injury and the alleged discriminatory practice.
In Wasserman v. Three Seasons Association, No. 1,13" a married
:30 933 F. Supp. 1394 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
3' See id. at 1397-99. Three appraisers agreed that the value of the condomin-
ium was $145,000 with the covenant, but there was disagreement as to the value of
the condominium without the covenant. The Association was found liable for dis-
criminatory conduct under the Act and the court awarded the Simovits $26,060.15,
which included $12,500 for the reduction in value of the condominium, $3560 for the
additional mortgage payments, and $10,000 in punitive damages. See id. at 1408.
132 See id. at 1399-1400.
133 See id. at 1400 (stating that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because their
"financial and emotional injuries are 'fairly traceable' to the Association's alleged
misconduct") (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376 (1982)).
"s4 See id.
"s 998 F. Supp. 1445 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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couple with no children applied for housing at a condominium
complex. During the screening process, they were questioned as
to whether they intended to have children. They were also asked
to sign a declaration stating that they "swear on all that is holy
in the Hebrew religion" not to reproduce while living at the con-
dominium."' If, by accident, the wife did become pregnant, the
document made them promise to move out of the condominium
before the wife gave birth.'37
The couple refused to sign the document and, not surpris-
ingly, their application was denied. Their subsequent lawsuit
alleged that they were discriminated against because of their
"familial status" under the FHAA. The wife was not pregnant,
nor did they establish that they intended to procreate in the near
future. They objected to the document based upon both philo-
sophical differences and the fear that one day, if she did become
pregnant, they would be forced to vacate the condominium. 8'
The court dismissed the case because the Wassermans
lacked standing.' 9 The non-class members had not established
under which protected class they were bringing suit. Fear of fu-
ture discrimination was not enough of a stake in the controversy
to establish standing; the Wassermans had not suffered any in-
jury as a result of the association's discrimination against pro-
tected class members. 40
C. Deer Hill Arms II-An Example of the Broad Construction of
the "Housing for Older Persons" Exemption Since 1995
The 1995 amendments broadened the opportunities for
"adult only" communities to qualify for the "housing for older
persons" exemption. This has had a significant impact on both
condominium and cooperative residents who want to live in a
setting without children.'4' A community's failure to qualify for
the exemption gives both applicants and residents who wish to
138 I& at 1446.
137 See id
138 See id. at 1446-48.
u9 See id. at 1448.
140 See id.
' The median age of residents in condominiums and cooperatives in New York
City is 50 years old, with a median income of $57,600. See MICHAEL H. SCHILL &
BENJAMIN P. SCAFIDI, HOUSING CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS IN NEW YORK CITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE 1996 HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY at tbl.5 (visited March 11,
1999) <http://www.nycrgb.com/conference/Schill/stable5.html>.
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sell their units to families with children another avenue to chal-
lenge the residential association's right of first refusal, the with-
holding of consent, and the restrictive covenants.1
2
Since 1995, however, the courts have given the FHAA ex-
emption as broad an interpretation as possible in order to protect
senior citizen housing. One example of the exemption's broad
scope is found in Deer Hill Arms II Limited Partnership v. Plan-
ning Commission of Danbury,' which involved two condomin-
ium buildings, Deer Hill Arms I and II. Deer Hill Arms I con-
sisted of twenty-eight dwelling units available to persons of any
age, whereas Deer Hill Arms II consisted of thirty-two dwelling
units available solely to adults over the age of fifty-five who did
not have any children."4 At issue was whether Deer Hill Arms II
could qualify for the "Housing for Older Persons" exemption.
The residential association argued that eighty percent of its con-
dominium units were occupied by persons at least fifty-five years
of age. 1
45
If the court treated both buildings as a single project, then
only fifty-one percent of the housing units were occupied by a
person of at least fifty-five years of age. 4 ' However, if Deer Hill
Arms II were treated as its own separate entity, it would un-
questionably qualify for the exemption because every unit was
occupied by someone older than fifty-five years of age. 47 Signifi-
cantly persuaded by the intent of the legislature in 1995 to afford
senior citizens the opportunity to exclude children,'" the Su-
14 See Lippman v. Bridgecrest Estates I Unit Owners Ass'n, No. 72762, 1998
WL 549272 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1998) (reasoning that the condominium residen-
tial association violated the FHAA because it failed to qualify for the exemption, and
it exercised its right of first refusal solely to discriminate against persons under 52
years of age).
It should be noted that even though housing communities may qualify for the
federal law exemption, they may still be found liable for discrimination under their
own state laws. See generally Timothy C. Cashmore et al., Housing For Older Per-
sons: Providing For a Graying America or Unlawfully Excluding the Balance?, 6 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 212 (1997) (describing the similarities
and differences between the federal law and the state laws of Illinois, Florida, New
Jersey, Connecticut, Texas, California, and New York).
'0686 A.2d 974 (Conn. 1996).
'4 See id. at 976-78.
"5 See id. at 978; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(i) (1994).
1'4 See Deer Hill Arms II, 686 A.2d at 974.
147 See id.
'4 The court was persuaded by statements made by Congressmen during the
amendment of 1995, actually quoting statements by Senators Kennedy, Cranston,
and Metzenbaum and Representatives Fish, Pepper, Edwards, and Synar. See id. at
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preme Court of Connecticut treated the buildings as separate
entities, even though they shared a common driveway and legal
title to the land was in the name of "Deer Hill Arms Condomin-
ium."
149
The court justified its holding by stating that the buildings
were operated by separate residential associations. 50 Further,
the residents of one building did not have access to the other
building's common areas, nor did they pay its common charges or
expenses. 5'
It was also possible that Deer Hills Arms I and II violated
specific HUD regulations and should, therefore, have been con-
sidered one entity when the percentage of older Americans in the
condominium was calculated.'52 The regulations prohibit assign-
ing anyone "to a particular section of a community, neighborhood
or development, or to a particular floor of a building, because
of... familial status."'53 However, the regulations were deemed
inapplicable because there was no centralized residential asso-
ciation that assigned persons to one of the two buildings.'
If a condominium or cooperative cannot qualify for the ex-
emption, it is subject to the terms of the FHAA and prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of familial status. Therefore, it
is relevant to note the elements of a prima facie case for age dis-
crimination.
C. The Elements of a Prima Facie Case
A prima facie case for a discrimination claim under the Act
can be established based on one of two theories: disparate impact
or disparate treatment. 5' A discrimination claim will not suc-
979 n.12.
' See id at 979.
1O See id
151 See id
1S2 See id at n.14.
1'3 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(4) (1998).
See Deer Hill Arms II, 686 A.2d at 979 n.14.
.. See United States v. Branella, 972 F. Supp. 294, 298; see also Simms v. First
Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that only the disparate
treatment theory or the disparate impact theory need be proven to support a prima
facie case of discrimination); Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary
ex rel. VanLoozenoord, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Betsey v. Turtle
Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984) (same). A disabled person may also
prove discrimination under the FHAA by showing the housing community failed to
provide reasonable accommodation. See Schanz v. Village Apartments, 998 F. Supp.
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ceed against a housing community if it is based solely upon the
fact that a person falls within the protected class and is rejected
from a particular housing community.'56
The disparate impact theory applies to cases where housing
practices are neutral on their face, but operate in a discrimina-
tory manner to produce a discriminatory result.5 7 The majority
of courts hold that discriminatory intent is not a factor.5 8 Under
this approach, potential applicants do not have to prove that the
residential association intended to discriminate against them be-
cause of their children. Some courts, however, have refused to
acknowledge that every act that produces a discriminatory effect
violates the Act.'59 The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
intent is a necessary element under the discriminatory impact
theory.1
60
784, 788 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
m Cf. Russell v. Popper, No. 89-2311, 1990 WL 140591, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 27,
1990) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (dismissing plaintiffs complaint be-
cause it consisted only of the fact that she was a black female that was denied
housing by the residential association of a condominium complex).
157 See Pechillis v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, No. 917512B,
1993 WL 818592, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 28, 1993) ("The theory applies to
cases in which... housing practices are facially neutral and 'fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation.' ") (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.. 424, 431
(1971)); see also Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482 (9th Cir. 1988) (observing that in
a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff must prove at least that the residential asso-
ciation's actions produce a discriminatory effect); Branella, 972 F. Supp. at 297
(describing the theory behind discriminatory impact).
'5 See Branella, 972 F. Supp. at 298 (holding that disparate impact alone does
not need proof of discriminatory intent); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:
RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1046 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that only discrimina-
tory operation need be proven); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 454 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that discriminatory effect is sufficient to satisfy
the rima facie case and discriminatory motive is not necessary).
V59 See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (requiring the consideration of four factors when deter-
mining whether the action has a discriminatory impact, although not requiring a
strong showing as to any factor). The factors considered by the Seventh Circuit are:
(1) the strength of the plaintiffs case based upon discriminatory effect; (2) whether
there is some evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant's interest in tak-
ing the action complained of; and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the de-
fendant to affirmatively provide housing for a protected class or restrain the defen-
dant from interfering with property owners who wish to sell their dwellings. See id;
see also Knapp v. Eagle Property Management Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.
1995) (observing that the Supreme Court has never recognized that the disparate
impact analysis is appropriate in every situation).
'60 See Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18
(1989) (refusing to answer whether the disparate impact test without proof of dis-
criminatory intent is the appropriate test under a Title VII action because the ap-
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The better view seems to be the one taken by the majority of
courts in this country.16' These courts have held that a plaintiff
needs to show merely that the practices of the residential asso-
ciation have a statistically adverse effect on the protected
class.6 2 The only limitation is that the statistical inequality
must be "sufficiently substantial" to raise an inference that the
residential association's alleged discriminatory acts caused the
unfair treatment of the residents."s
Under a disparate treatment theory, the discriminatory in-
tent of the residential association is the dominating factor.'6 Al-
pellant conceded the applicability of the disparate impact theory); see also Frederic
S. Schwartz, The Fair Housing Act and 'Discriminatory Effect. A New Perspective,
11 NOVA L. REV. 71, 74 (1986) (illustrating, by way of example, a violation of the
FHAA).
'6' Intent is an elusive concept that is difficult to prove. See Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290 ("[A] requirement that the plaintiff prove discrimina-
tory intent before relief can be granted under the statute is often a burden that is
impossible to satisfy."); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir.
1972) (stating that motive and purpose are "elusive concepts" that can only be in-
ferred from facts). Also, motive can easily be concealed by intelligent people. See 12
Robinson v. Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that a court should
focus on discriminatory effect in order to provide fairness to private rights and the
public interest).
"2 See Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891 F. Supp. 1169, 1178 (E.D. Va.
1995) (stating that statistics have a critical effect on the significance of the alleged
disparity).
'6 Id. (noting the discrimination claims of African-Americans, Hispanics, and
disabled cooperative residents as the cooperative underwent conversion under the
FHA). Although there is no specific formula for determining whether there is an in-
ference of causation, some courts use a standard deviation. See Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996 (1988); Williams, 891 F. Supp. at 1178. No
statistical analysis, including the standard deviation approach, can prove what, in
fact, caused the results, but attempts to eliminate chance as the underlying reason.
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 996, n.3 (stating that the standard deviation or other sta-
tistical information play an important, but not dispositive, role in discrimination
cases); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 323 n.20 (7th Cir. 1988)
(same).
The standard deviation is a statistic used to measure the dispersion of a distri-
bution from an expected value. See Williams, 891 F. Supp. at 1180 n.22 (providing
definition of the standard deviation). Courts use both the binomial and hypergeo-
metric distributions. See id. See generally PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS FOR
ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS 116-131 (Ronald E. Walpole et al. eds., 6th ed. 1998)
(describing both the binomial and hypergeometric distributions and their relation-
ship to each other). A result may differ according to the formula used. See EEOC v.
Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1019 (4th Cir. 1983) (questioning whether a dif-
ferent statistical outcome may arise if a binomial distribution was used instead of a
hypergeometric distribution).
'" See Martin v. Palm Beach Atlantic Ass'n, 696 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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though it does not have to be the sole motivating factor, the
plaintiff must show that his or her "familial status" is a motiva-
tion behind the residential association's denial of the applica-
tion." Intent can be established by indirect evidence 166 or direct
evidence. 167 However, the latter will be more difficult to prove.'8
Establishing a prima facie case raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption of discriminatory intent.69 This shifts the burden to
the defendant who must then produce evidence that the refusal
to rent or negotiate for a rental was motivated by non-
App. 1997); Branella, 972 F. Supp. at 298; see also Schroeder v. Bertolo, 942 F.
Supp. 72, 79 (D.P.R. 1996) (holding that evidence of a satisfactory job performance
by the president of the residential association of the condominium complex was
relevant as to intent).
"6 See Branella, 972 F. Supp. at 298; cf Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1042 (holding
that, in a racial discrimination case, an African-American male had to show only
that his race was one of the reasons he was rejected by the cooperative residential
association).
'6 See Branella, 972 F. Supp. at 298; see also Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs.,
736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984) (approving the standard that was applied to adult-only
rental policies before the amendments of 1988 were passed).
'6 The direct method of proving intent can be satisfied by circumstantial evi-
dence. See Cavalieri-Conway v. L. Butterman Assocs., 992 F. Supp. 995, 1003 (N.D.
IMI. 1998). Circumstantial evidence can be in the form of suspicious timing, ambigu-
ous statements or behavior or comments made to the protected group, or it can be
evidence that other residents or applicants received systematically better treat-
ment. See id.
In the absence of direct evidence, a complainant may still prove a prima facie
case of housing discrimination by satisfying the four part test set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972), and detailed below. See Secretary
ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that this
standard applies to Fair Housing cases); cf Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp. 108 F.3d
246, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply the McDonnell Douglas standard to
the pleadings); United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1017 (M.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding that where direct evidence is available to prove discriminatory intent, the
McDonnell Douglas standard does not apply).
The McDonnell Douglas test is as follows: First, the complainant must show
that he or she is a member of the protected class. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411
U.S. at 802. Second, it must be proven that the applicant applied for and was quali-
fied to rent the housing unit in question. See id. Third, it must be shown that the
complainant was rejected and, fourth, that the unit remained available after the
rejection. See id. For an example of the failure to satisfy the prima facie case in a
condominium familial status discrimination claim, see Martin v. Palm Beach Atl.
Ass'n, 696 So. 2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
'68 See United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1360 (D. Haw.
1995); see also United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating
that "direct proof of unlawful discrimination is rarely available").
19 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Blomgren v. Ogle, 850 F. Supp.




discriminatory reasons. If this burden is satisfied, then the
plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
reasons the defendant offered are pretextual. 17' Intentional dis-
crimination may be inferred from an association's failure to re-
but either the prima facie case or the plaintiffs evidence that the
justifications are pretextual.'72
'70 See id.; Blackwell, 908 F.2d at 870. The defendant must show that it could
not achieve its goals with a less discriminatory alternative. See SINGER, supra note
158, at 1046; see also Schanz v. Village Apartments, 998 F. Supp. 784, 789 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (concluding that poor credit and inadequate income are valid non-
discriminatory reasons to reject an applicant to an apartment building); Murphy v.
253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a
cooperative's subjective non-discriminatory reasons for rejecting an applicant, such
as being non-responsive, will not defeat a prima facie case of housing discrimina-
tion); Weiser, supra note 8, at Al (quoting a federal judge who stated that a coop-
erative's defense that an applicant was "arrogant" was simply a "code name
for... discrimination").
Some courts require only that the defendant show that a policy was established
for a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason, while other courts apply a test
similar to the constitutional strict scrutiny test, requiring a defendant to demon-
strate that the least restrictive means were used to achieve a compelling business
interest. See Fair Hous. Council of Orange County, Inc. v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315,
318 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (explaining the court's position with respect to the defendant's
burden); see also Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (illustrating
a prima facie case of racial housing discrimination analyzed using the business
standard).
171 See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 807.
'72 See Kushner, supra note 12, at 1075 (reporting how a violation under the
Fair Housing Act is established and how it compares to the burden of proof under
the equal protection clause).
A claim that a residential association has a history of rejecting applicants be-
cause of their familial status is insufficient to establish that the association's rea-
sons for rejecting the applicant were simply pretextual. See Blackwell, 908 F.2d at
870; Hitter v. Rubin, 617 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (App. Div. 1994) (indicating that an eld-
erly applicant's age discrimination claim failed because it was based solely upon a
statement from her broker in which she was told the cooperative had a history of
discouraging the elderly to buy because they were so much of a burden). On the
other hand, a residential association cannot avoid a discriminatory finding by
claiming that the exclusion of children was based on the lack of safety in the com-
mon areas. See Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1354; United States v. Grishman,
818 F. Supp. 21 (D. Me. 1993) (noting that a housing provider does not have the
power under the 1988 amendments to weigh the safety risks of the premises and
conclude that the premises are inappropriate for children). Discrimination may still
exist even if the association was afraid that the death or injury of a child would re-
sult in financial ruin of the members. See Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1361.
For an example of the failure of an applicant to prove that the condominium asso-
ciation's reasons were pretextual, see Laurenti v. Water's Edge Habitat, Inc., 837 F.
Supp. 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [73:273
III. AGE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN CONDOMINIUMS AND
COOPERATIVES BENEFIT OLDER PERSONS
The underlying issue is whether society should view these
senior communities as practicing age discrimination,'7 3 especially
when only ten percent of Americans over the age of fifty live in
age-restricted communities" and the number of persons over the
age of fifty-five is dwarfed by the number of children under the
age of eighteen.' 5 The issue presented is even more disturbing
when only five percent of elderly households are in condomini-
ums or cooperatives. 17 6 However, this will probably be less con-
troversial when the "baby-boomers" retire in approximately fif-
teen years and the number of retirees reaches an all-time high.'
7
There is a rise in the number of older persons who are
choosing to live in senior housing.1 78 Older persons often move
"' See James Brooke, Young Unwelcome in Retirees' Haven, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1997, at 16 (describing the Fair Housing Act as prohibiting discrimination based
upon race, religion, sex or familial status, but actually allowing discrimination
against children through the exemption).
17 See id. Age-restricted condominiums are prevalent in New Jersey, Connecti-
cut, Florida, California, and Arizona. See Brooks, supra note 43, at 3R. In Arizona,
approximately half of its residents age 55 or older live in an age-restricted commu-
nity. See Brooke, supra note 173, at 16.
75 For example, in Florida, those age 55 and over total 588,552, compared to
2,866,237 children under the age of 18. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY POPULATION
AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 1 (1991). In Georgia, those over 55 total 259,735 as
compared to 1,727,303 children under 18. See id. In California, there are 1,133,907
over-55 citizens, compared to 7,750,725 under 18. See id.
176 See GOLANT, supra note 7, at 29 (noting, in addition, that approximately 82%
were homeowners).
17 See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE AARP: AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LOBBY AND
THE CLASH OF GENERATIONS 97 (1996) (noting that, in 1995, there were 24 million
Americans over the age of 70, which is predicted to grow to 27 million by 2010, at
which point, the baby boomers start reaching retirement age and the number of re-
tirees increases to 48 million in 2030).
178 The American Association of Retired Persons conducted two national surveys
in 1986 and 1989. See GOLANT, supra note 7, at 14. The 1986 survey included only
persons over the age of 59 and the 1989 survey included only persons over the age of
54. See id. In 1989, 6% more respondents would rather live in an age-restricted
building than one with all age groups. See id. This is supported by a decrease of 10%
in the number of older persons who preferred to live in a household consisting of
more than one age group. See id.; DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, GROWING OLD IN
AMERICA: THE BLAND-LEE LECTURES DELIVERED AT CLARK UNIVERSITY 149 (1977)
(reporting the results of a survey in which 73% of older persons responded that they
would prefer to live in communities occupied by a majority of retired people).
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into age-restricted communities, not because they are presently
living in unmanageable or intolerable housing conditions, but
simply because they have found their former home to be too ex-
pensive, time-consuming or exhausting to maintain.179  Addi-
tionally, it is not uncommon for older persons to want to associ-
ate with those who share common interests and hobbies and
have similar economic and social backgrounds. 8 Generally, they
no longer have an interest in organizations designed for younger
persons, such as professional groups and the PTA, but join age-
related associations such as leisure and fraternal clubs.' 8'
There is no evidence that residency in a childless community
is associated with a lack of desire to have any contact with chil-
dren. 82 One result of living in a childless community is that it
179 See Graham A. Allen & Rebecca G. Adams, Aging and the Structure of
Friendship, in OLDER ADULT FRIENDSHIP: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS (Rebecca G.
Adams & Rosemary Blieszner eds., 1989) (noting that older persons relocate to new
residences because their homes are too large and too expensive to maintain or the
individuals, themselves have lost their physical mobility or the capacity to drive a
car); Golant, supra note 7, at 71; John P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY
LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATiVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 807-808 (1998)
(suggesting that the rise of common interest communities is due to tax motivation;
securing the integrity of the neighborhood; maintenance-free common areas; addi-
tional services, such as, utility service, security, and fire protection); N.Y. CITY
RENT GUIDELINES BD., HOUSING NYC: RENTS, MARKETS & TRENDS '97 74 (1997)
(noting that the monthly costs of mortgages and taxes are, in many cases, more ex-
pensive than the common charges found within the cooperatives and condomini-
ums); see also James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Com-
munity Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1136-37 (1998) (describing the
economic revolution which led to the increase in common-interest communities).
In a survey of 293 condominium owners, 43% bought a condominium because it
was a good investment, 19% bought a condo as a tax shelter, 13% believed they were
getting a better place to live, 12% liked the fact that there was no maintenance, and
a final 12% believed a condo was less expensive than renting. See JOHN R.
DINKELSPIEL ET AL., CONDOMINIUIS: THE EFFECTS OF CONVERSION ON A COM-
MUNITY 15 tbl.2.3 (1981) (pointing out that the percentages were based upon the to-
tal number of responses). The AARP noted that, in 1989, 65% of older Americans
anticipated needing help with maintaining the outside of their homes, compared to
40% in 1986. See GOLANT, supra note 7, at 15.
'8 See GOLANT, supra note 7, at 69-72 (discussing the characteristics of resi-
dents of retirement communities and why these communities are so appealing).
181 See FISCHER, supra note 178, at 150. Studies conducted by gerontologists il-
lustrate that most elderly people are still active, albeit in different ways than the
younger generations. See icL at 149-50.
See JENNIE-KEITH ROSS, OLD PEOPLE, NEW LIVES: COMMUNITY CREATION IN
A RETIREMENT RESIDENCE 193 (1977); see also Robert Nolin, W.o Kids' and Staying
That Way; Some Seniors Find Security in Isolation, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
July 12, 1998, at IG, available in 1998 WL 12821664 (quoting retired gerontologist,
Gordon Streib, who does not believe that the desire to live away from children is due
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
may actually improve an older person's relationship with chil-
dren." ' The increased sense of security, regarding physical and
financial needs, allows older persons to relax, thus permitting a
more rewarding relationship with those children with whom they
have contact."M
There is an inherent sense in all of us to protect children
from being excluded from any aspect of life. Restrictive cove-
nants cannot be justified simply because it is believed that they
would combat the social pressure to bear children and, as a re-
sult, aid in controlling the problem of overpopulation. 1  Instead,
housing communities that exclude children should be openly re-
ceived when the health and welfare of another group of persons
are in the balance.
For a substantial period of time, courts have recognized the
importance of restrictive covenants in condominiums and coop-
eratives. Judicial enforcement of residential covenants that ex-
clude children may be desirable because it maintains the stabil-
ity of the environment.'86 In Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo-
minium Ass'n, 8' an amended by-law excluding persons eighteen
years of age or younger from occupying a high-rise portion of a
condominium complex, was deemed reasonable because its pur-
pose was to eliminate the noise and rowdiness associated with
children.'"
Age restrictions have been upheld in condominiums where it
has been deemed reasonable to exclude children due to their
"independence, mischievousness, boisterousness, and rowdy-
to any hostility towards them); 141 CONG. REC. H14967 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Frank) (noting that "where you are dealing predominantly with
older people, where there is a common interest in an atmosphere that may be ac-




'85 See Larry D. Barnett, Children Exclusion Policies in Housing, 67 KY. L.J.
967, 970 (1979) (describing the theory of "voluntary childlessness," which bases it-
self on the assumption that some potential parents will choose not to have children
because of the obstacles raised by their existence when attempting to obtain housing
in desirable condominiums or apartments).
18 See Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 652.
18 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Ct. App. 1978).
'88 See id. at 698-99; see also Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 98 Cal. Rptr. 644
(Ct. App. 1971) (holding that arbitrary discrimination by a landlord was prohibited
but because "boisterousness and rowdyism" vary by age and sex, a landlord seeking
to limit children is not unreasonably arbitrary).
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ism.""9 This raises the question as to whether a purely adult
condominium or cooperative is synonymous with a peaceful and
serene environment.9 ' A residential association is not com-
pletely powerless to abate the problems caused by noisy chil-
dren."9 Furthermore, if it is reasonable to exclude children from
housing based upon these "generalized traits,"' then, arguably,
every place of public accommodation would have the right to ex-
clude children.' However, the close proximity of housing units
in condominiums and cooperatives provides additional support to
the idea of living without rowdy children.94 One of the major
dissatisfactions among older people in condo or coop housing is
the increased noise level. 5 It seems that the desire to protect
the well-being of older persons will prevail over the argument of
unfairness to families with children.
Excluding children also allows the condominium or coopera-
tive to provide only those types of common areas and recrea-
tional facilities that adults would prefer.' 96 In White Egret Con-
dominium, Inc. v. Franklin,7 the court acknowledged that
Flowers, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
1~O This was one of the major arguments made on behalf of the elderly in oppo-
sition to the FHAA. See Allen, supra note 51, at 301-02 (arguing that a child-free
housing complex provided seniors with freedom of choice to live in a serene envi-
ronment); see also Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747, 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) ("The ob-
vious purpose [of a covenant restricting occupancy to persons 21 or older] is to cre-
ate a quiet, peaceful neighborhood by eliminating noise associated with children at
play or otherwise.... "); Dubreul v. West Winds Mobile Lodge, 213 Cal. Rptr. 12,
17-18 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Nolin, supra note 182, at IG (interviewing older per-
sons who live in condominiums out of a desire for peace and quiet). See generally DI
LORENZO, supra note 7, at § 7.04[2] [a] (noting that courts will recognize the validity
of restrictive covenants in a condominium-setting when founded on a desire to cre-
ate a peaceful environment).
'9 Cf O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 431 (Cal. 1993) (in
banc) (refusing to uphold an age restriction in a condominium complex because the
residential association could have adopted department regulations).
192 id.
" See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982) (in bank). A "no
children" policy in an apartment complex was promulgated in an effort to provide
tenants with peaceful housing and further the landlord's business interests. See id.
at 117. The policy was struck down because the court refused to sacrifice the rights
of children for a loss of profits or convenience. See id. at 129.
"4 See Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the Enforceability of Condominium
Rules, 22 STETSON L. REV. 1133, 1157 (1993) (noting that restrictions upon transfer
of condominium units is reasonable because of the unit owners' financial depend-
ence upon one another and the close proximity of living quarters).
" See GOLANT, supra note 7, at 30.
' See DI LORENZO, supra note 7, at § 7.0412] [a].
379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1980).
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children and senior citizens have different needs. 9 ' Children
and their families desire tennis courts and playgrounds but, in a
complex housed by a majority of older persons, these facilities
would produce economic waste because they would go unused.'99
Arguments for a child-free environment can also be based
upon an economic analysis. The absence of children means that
residents can avoid providing schools, which implies lower
taxes.00 It is also indisputable that children cause damage.20' As
a consequence, a housing community that allows occupancy by
children is far more susceptible to tort liability and increased in-
surance rates.0 2 Therefore, their exclusion from a condominium
and cooperative allows a residential association to maintain con-
trol over repairs and common fees.23
Courts also recognize that older persons' psychological and
sociological needs might be better served by living in a condomin-
ium or cooperative away from children.2 They need to identify
198 See id. at 351; see also Pomerantz v. Woodlands Section 8 Ass'n, 479 So. 2d
794, 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (extending the rationale of Franklin to all forms
of housing).
'99 See Franklin, 379 So. 2d at 351; see also Pomerantz, 479 So. 2d at 795.
200 See Brooke, supra note 173 (noting that in Youngstown, Arizona the presence
of children would create school taxes that would double the average current tax
bill).
201 See DI LORENZO, supra note 7, at § 7.04[2] [a]. See, e.g., Marina Point, Ltd. v.
Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 119 (Cal. 1982) (discussing the testimony of an expert who
stated that, as a class, children cause more wear and tear on property than adults,
resulting in higher maintenance costs for landlords).
One court refused to uphold the exclusion of children on the ground that they
cause damages. See Gilman v. City of Newark, 180 A.2d 365, 380 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1962) (discussing a rooming house ordinance that excluded persons under
the age of eighteen except for emancipated minors or minors attending college). The
Gilman court asserted that society fears children will cause damage by starting
fires. See id. at 381. In contrast with this argument, the court pointed out that one
of the most common causes of fire is that of smoking. See id. The court reasoned
that because college students and children over the age of eighteen are more likely
to smoke, it was illogical to exclude those under the age of eighteen. See id This
court's logic, however, completely overlooks the traditional and well-founded fear
that children play with matches and, in so doing, start fires. As an aside, the court
should have acknowledged that 18% of those students graduating high school, who
are under eighteen years old, are already smokers. See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 27 (Kurt J. Isselbacher et al. eds., 13th ed. 1994).
202 See Allen, supra note 51, at 302. The median income of a 65 year old or older
male is $14,983, which is $6,000 more than the median female income for the same
age group. See Cashmore et al., supra note 142, at 213. This income decreases as
persons become older or live alone. See id. at 213-14.
203 See DI LORENZO, supra note 7, at § 7.04[21 [a].
204 See, e.g., Pomerantz v. Woodlands Section 8 Ass'n, Inc., 479 So. 2d 794, 795
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with a housing community to avoid isolation, depression, and
loneliness."5 It is a general belief among gerontologists that as
one becomes older, one's sense of satisfaction in life depends
quite heavily upon one's living environment.' In addition to
being in the same age group, it is common for residents in age-
restricted communities to share such similar characteristics as
social class, ethnicity, marital status, sex, or political affiliation,
which help to contribute to a resident's identification and satis-
faction within the community."
Residents in these communities tend to have higher morale
and are healthier than those in an integrated community, be-
cause of the proximity of many peers and the large number of
friendships that formed.0 The nature of age-segregated housing
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding age restriction in condominium due in part to
testimony that as people age their psychological needs change, and asserting that
age-restricted communities increase morale); see also JANE PORCINO, LIVING
LONGER, LIVING BETTER: ADVENTURES IN COMMUNITY HOUSING FOR THOSE IN THE
SECOND HALF OF LIFE 126 (1991) (arguing that adult communities provide for
healthier, longer lives). See generally DI LORENZO, supra note 7, at § 7.04[2] [a]. But
see Gilman, 180 A.2d at 381 (noting that the exclusion of children under the age of
18 does not contribute in anyway to the physical health of residents of an "adults
only" community).
. See HAROLD Cox, LATER LIFE: THE REALITIES OF AGING 234 (1984). Psy-
chologist Richard Golant recognizes that older persons in an age-restricted condo-
minium may not want to live near children because they would be constantly re-
minded of their own mortality. See Nolin, supra note 182, at 1G. Golant defines such
behavior as a 'deviant pattern' or 'distance to death.' See id.; GOLANT, supra note 7,
at 72 (citations omitted) (noting that "it is easier [for a resident of a retirement
community] to deny his age and flatter himself in accordance with the norm of
youth"). There are a few gerontologists, however, who believe that age-restricted
communities promote depression because an older person interacting only with
other older persons is constantly reminded of age and death. See COX, supra, at 234.
They believe that integrated communities provide for a higher morale and stimula-
tion. See id.; see, e.g., PORCINO, supra note 204, at 129 (describing the story of a 73-
year old woman whose experiences at an age-restricted community led to depression
and no feeling of self-worth).
2 See COX, supra note 205, at 235-36 (charting the environmental changes that
occur between the ages of 50-65, 65-75, and over 75).
217 See ROSS, supra note 182, at 178 (basing this conclusion on a study of four
age-restricted communities that included a condominium, a mobile home park, an
apartment building, and a life-care home).
203 See COX, supra note 205, at 234-38; PORCINO, supra note 204, at 126
(suggesting that the move to a retirement community may seem like a sacrifice of
independence but is really a decision that can result in a longer and healthier life).
The friendships formed later on in life are important to those older persons who are
living alone. Individuals living alone now constitute a major portion of the popula-
tion over the age of 65. See Cashmore et al., supra note 142, at 213 (noting that 25%
of persons between the ages of 65 and 74 live alone and that figure nearly doubles at
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provides residents with the opportunity to pursue these friend-
ships because all residents are in similar situations.29  Even
those residents who do not seek social contact have an increased
sense of morale in an age-restricted community with the devel-
opment of an age identity, emergence of a social norm, and the
security of knowing there is help in case of emergency. 21 It has
also been suggested that these communities spark creativity
among their members.2 ' Studies show that the most creative
persons are independent and introverts.2u Residents of "adults
only" communities often possess these characteristics, which
could indicate that they are more creative than others in their
age group.
213
It is important to recognize the situation of older persons, as
well as children. The FHAA is only one of several federal statues
designed to protect children from discrimination.24 The elderly
are not part of a strong political force 25 and it is important that
federal legislation recognizes their psychological and sociological
needs as well.
the ae of 85).
See Allen & Adams, supra note 179, at 59. Adult friendships affect women
more than men because they are more likely to live in an age-restricted community
and to live alone. See id.; ROSS, supra note 182, at 176-77 (noting that the group
most strongly affected by having other seniors near them are older women who
never married or lost a spouse). Only 42% of women aged 65 and older are married,
compared to 72% of men in the same age category. See Cashmore et al., supra note
142, at 213. Most friendships find a basis in similar social characteristics, however,
studies showed that while marital status was not a factor in friendships formed in
age-restricted communities, it was a significant factor in other communities. See
Allen & Adams, supra note 179, at 58-59.




214 See Daniel L. Skoler, Anti-Discrimination and Identity Rights of the Child, in
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW 109, 113-114 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard
A. Davidson eds., 1990) (noting that the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act pro-
tects the rights of homeless children to an education; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act protect the rights of children
with disabilities, among others, to education; Social Security amendments protect
the rights of all children to receive insurance benefits).
21,See Douglas Dobson, The Elderly as a Political Force, in AGING AND PUBLIC
POLICY: THE POLITICS OF GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 129, 133-141 (William P.
Browne & Laura Katz Olson eds., 1983) (suggesting that there is no unified political
force among the contemporary elderly because there is no "age-based identification,"




People move to both condominiums and cooperatives for a
variety of reasons, one of which is the ability to determine future
residents and neighbors. Prior to the 1988 FHAA, this could be
accomplished through age-restrictive covenants. Families with
children would be excluded from residency, even if they were fi-
nancially capable of living in the community.
The enactment of the FHAA rendered these covenants inva-
lid unless a community satisfied the "housing for older persons"
exemption. Both the statute and the "housing for older persons"
exemption are interpreted very broadly by the courts. They
reach condominiums, cooperatives, residential associations, and
allow standing by those without children under the age of eight-
een. In some circumstances, the prima facie case for age dis-
crimination can be proven without any showing of discriminatory
intent.
The exemption of "housing for older persons" is an acknowl-
edgment by Congress of the needs of older persons. It does not
reflect any animosity towards children but, rather, the desire to
protect older Americans, in addition to children. It simply allows
older persons the right to choose to live with persons their own
age.
Nicole Napolitano*
* Candidate for Juris Doctorate, 2000. I thank my parents and sisters for their
tremendous support in all of my endeavors.
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